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SLURS, TRUTH-VALUE JUDGEMENTS, 
AND CONTEXT SENSITIVITY
ROBERTO B. SILEO
Abstract: Cappelen and Lepore (2005) claim that the English language contains a basic and limited 
set of context-sensitive expressions, as only expressions within this set pass the truth-related tests that they 
propose to single out context-sensitive from context-insensitive words. In this paper, I argue that racial and 
ethnic slurs also pass Cappelen and Lepore’s context sensitivity tests and that, as a result, slurs should also be 
seen as context-sensitive expressions in a truth-related sense. 
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Introduction
It is widely acknowledged in the semantics and pragmatics literature that though racial and 
ethnic slurs are generally used by bigots to derogate and/or offend, they can also be used by 
individuals of the same race, ethnicity and/or nationality to communicate friendly and self-
appropriated messages of camaraderie (Anderson & Lepore, 2013a, 2013b; Allan, 2015). 
There seems to be agreement that the meaning of slurs may vary, in this respect, from context 
to context.
In an attempt to keep semantics close to lexical meaning and the output of syntax, with 
minimum input from context, Cappelen and Lepore (2005) propose that each declarative 
sentence expresses one and only one minimal proposition, while speakers can perform a 
variety of speech acts by using a single set of linguistic expressions. Cappelen and Lepore 
(2005, p. 190) refer to this particular claim as “speech act pluralism”. The utterance in (1) is 
taken to convey, for example, the context-independent minimal proposition that the person 
being discussed is currently happy, and apt to communicate, in different scenarios, the 
context-dependent intended messages in (2):
(1) “She is happy.”
(2) Possible communicated meanings: “She is no longer angry.”
  “Her medication is working.”
  “She is ready to meet her sister.” 
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 145)
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Within their minimalist framework, in which semantics involves the identification of 
minimal propositions, Cappelen and Lepore suggest three truth-related tests to pick out 
context-sensitive expressions from context-insensitive ones, and they purport, based on 
their analysis, that the English language contains a basic and limited set of words which is 
sensitive to context in a truth-related sense. While Cappelen and Lepore do not include racial 
and ethnic slurs within this set, I argue that slurs intuitively pass the context sensitivity tests 
that they propose and that, as a result, slurs are also context-sensitive expressions in a truth-
related sense.1 
Before I embark on this task, three methodological clarifications need to be made. 
First, since slurs comprise a descriptive layer of meaning determined by the target’s race, 
ethnicity, and/or nationality as well as an evaluative layer that bigots and in-group speakers 
can, in different contexts, convey (see e.g. Predelli, 2013), I refer to such layers of meaning, 
respectively, as “descriptiveness” and negative or positive “expressiveness”. 2 Second, I use 
the terms “slurs” and “slurring lexical items” to refer to strong derogatory and/or offensive 
racial and ethnic words. Following Anderson and Lepore (2013a) and Saka (2007), I 
acknowledge that slurring terms can culturally evoke varying degrees of derogation and/
or offense, nonetheless, in the current discussion, I do not analyse negative expressiveness 
across different slurs and I leave such an analysis to sociolinguistics. Finally, in the 
illustrations, I employ “ε” to refer to expressive racial and ethnic slurs, and “δ” to refer to 
their descriptive, neutral counterparts. This is to avoid distracting readers from the universal 
claims that I propose by mentioning emotionally loaded expressions.3
Racial and ethnic slurs as context-sensitive expressions
Broadly following Kaplan (1989), Cappelen and Lepore (2005) claim that there is a 
basic and limited set of context-sensitive expressions in English and they propose three 
truth-related tests to identify context sensitivity: the collectivity test, the inter-contextual 
disquotational test, and the inter-contextual disquotational indirect reporting test (IDIRT).4 
Cappelen and Lepore (2005) propose that the semantic (truth-related) values of context-
insensitive expressions do not change from context to context (unlike those of context-
sensitive expressions or members of the basic set), and that the conjunction of two true 
1 While minimalists assign truth values to the semantic content of sentences and generally 
disregard intuitive naturalness considerations (“You won’t die” [Borg, 2004, p. 34] is to be 
considered false at the level of the language system because the addressee is not immortal), 
Cappelen and Lepore (2005, p. 87) acknowledge that the tests that they propose are based on 
language users’ intuitions about the use of sentences in context.
2 Because slurring language can communicate either derogatory and/or offensive meanings 
or friendly messages of camaraderie, I also refer to negative and positive contexts, 
respectively. 
3 By following this “silentist” approach, I also emphasise my belief that no person is to be 
despised because of their race, ethnicity and/or nationality.
4 The basic set includes , without limitation, demonstratives, personal pronouns, and the 
adverbs “here”, “there”, “today”, “yesterday”, and “tomorrow” (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, 
p. 144).
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utterances containing a context-insensitive term will continue to be true. Cappelen and 
Lepore observe, for example, that the noun “penguins”, as used in the contextualised (and 
true) statements in (3) and (4), is to be taken as a context-insensitive expression, since the 
proposition expressed by the conjunction in (5) is true:
(3) “Penguins are happy.” (True)
(4) “Penguins are lazy.” (True)
(5) “Penguins are both lazy and happy.” (True) 
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 102)
Conversely, Cappelen and Lepore observe that the collective utterance in (8) containing 
the context-sensitive expression “yesterday” as originally used in the contextualised (and 
true) statements in (6) and (7) would be false in the context depicted below:
(6) (Uttered on a Monday): “Yesterday Rob left.” (True)
(7) (Uttered on a Tuesday): “Yesterday Ron left.” (True)
(8) (Uttered on a Wednesday): “Yesterday Rob and Ron left.” (False)
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 100)
When the collectivity test is applied to racial and ethnic slurs, the results predicted by 
Cappelen and Lepore’s formulations appear to hold in both negative and positive contexts, 
since, as non-members of the basic set, slurs could be regarded, at first sight, as context-
insensitive expressions. In relation to the examples below, the conjunctions in (11) and (14) 
remain to be true:
(9) (A bigot): “εs are people like Rob.” (True)
(10) (A bigot): “εs are people like Ron.” (True)
(11) (A bigot): “εs are people like Rob and Ron.” (True)
(12) (A proud in-group speaker): “εs are people like Rob.” (True)
(13) (A proud in-group speaker): “εs are people like Ron.” (True)
(14) (A proud in-group speaker): “εs are people like Rob and Ron.” (True)
Nonetheless, the fact that (11) and (14) are to be considered true appears to be merely 
accidental; it is possible to imagine a context in which, for example, the conjunction of two 
true statements as uttered on different occasions by the same in-group speaker could be taken 
to be false: 
(15) (A, feeling insulted): “εs are people like Rob (not me).” (True)
 Speaker’s message: “Rob is a despicable δ (I am not).”
(16) (A, feeling proud): “εs are people like me.” (True)
 Speaker’s message: “I am a proud δ.”
(17) A: * “εs are people like Rob and me.” (False)5
5 This sentence is unlikely to be uttered due to the different senses attributed to the slurring 
word. The * in the example is intended to signal that this is an unlikely use of the slurring 
term.
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It is important to note, nonetheless, that followers of Cappelen and Lepore’s views could 
still find it natural to claim that (17) is true, and while Cappelen and Lepore acknowledge 
that language users’ intuitions regarding collective descriptions can be inconsistent, I 
cannot but support the view that (17) is to be regarded as false. While the collectivity test 
seems to work well with (11) and (14), the conjunction in (17) appears to trigger an intuitive 
contradiction resulting from the different layers of expressiveness that can be attributed 
to the slur. It cannot be the case for A, a prejudiced and proud language user, that “εs” are 
people like Rob (despicable δs) and like him (non-despicable δs). In other words, intuitions 
regarding the assignment of truth values to conjunctive slurring statements are, in certain 
contexts, less robust and not as clear-cut as the more straightforward assignment of truth 
values in the examples that Cappelen and Lepore present.6 
Cappelen and Lepore introduce the inter-contextual disquotational test by stating that 
a linguistic expression is to be taken as context-sensitive if, in relation to a sentence S, an 
utterance of an instance of the schema in (18) can still be regarded as true:
(18) There are (or can be) false utterances of ‘S’ even though S.”
 (Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 105)
To illustrate, Cappelen and Lepore would suggest, for example, that the utterance in 
(19), which contains the context-insensitive expression “ready”, would not pass the inter-
contextual disquotational test, since if it is true that Rob is ready (regardless of the action 
that Rob might be ready to perform), it cannot be the case (it cannot be true) that there can be 
false utterances of “Rob is ready”:
(19) “Rob is ready.”
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 90)
Conversely, Cappelen and Lepore suggest that the utterance in (20), which contains the 
context-sensitive demonstrative “that”, would pass the inter-contextual disquotational test, 
since it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the speaker is pointing at two different 
referential objects, one nice and one not at all nice, in which case an instance of the inter-
contextual disquotational schema would be true:
(20) “That is nice.”
  (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 106)
6 In order to evaluate Cappelen and Lepore’s collectivity test, it is pertinent to compare 
examples in different contexts. Travis (2008), for instance, claims that Cappelen and 
Lepore’s collectivity analysis does not necessarily hold in relation to the allegedly context-
insensitive term “grunt”. In a context in which a boy undergoing a medical examination 
responds to the doctor’s touch with a grunt, the verb acquires a particular context-dependent 
meaning. In this context, it is clear that the boy is in pain. By contrast, in a context in which 
two friends are organising a party and one of them refuses to invite the boy because he 
allegedly grunts, the same verb will assume a completely different interpretation, since, in 
that scenario, it is claimed that he has an unappealing habit. As Travis explains, in a situation 
in which a friend denies that the boy has a habit of grunting, it cannot be truly stated that he 
“grunts and he does not” (Travis, 2008, p. 157).
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When the inter-contextual disquotational test is applied to racial and ethnic slurs, such 
lexical items do not appear to constitute, at first sight, context-sensitive expressions within 
Cappelen and Lepore’s minimalist framework. As (21) and (22) illustrate, such a conclusion 
could be reached in both negative and positive contexts. If either a bigot or a proud in-group 
speaker truly identified Rob as an “ε”, that is, as a person that one of them despises and that 
the other one likes, it could not be the case, it could not be true, that there could be false 
utterances of “Rob is an ε”:
(21) (A bigot): “Rob is an ε. I despise Rob.”
(22) (A proud in-group speaker): “Rob is an ε. I like Rob.”
Upon closer examination, nevertheless, it is possible to imagine slurring contexts in 
which instances of the inter-contextual disquotational schema could be taken to be true. It is 
conceivable, for example, that A, the prejudiced and proud in-group speaker in my previous 
examples, could utter a derogatory and/or offensive statement such as “εs are people like 
Rob”, and said statement, if interpreted in a certain context as an expression of camaraderie, 
would be taken to be false. As I illustrated in (15), prejudiced in-group members could still 
hold derogatory and/or offensive attitudes towards other members of their own groups. To 
follow Cappelen and Lepore’s formulation, it then seems that there could be a false utterance 
of the positively evaluated interpretation of “εs are people like Rob” even though, according 
to the prejudiced, derogatory and/or offensive speaker, “εs are people like Rob”.7 
Finally, Cappelen and Lepore state that if an expression renders a disquotational reported 
utterance false, that expression is to be taken as context-sensitive. Cappelen and Lepore 
observe that different utterances of (23), which contain the context-insensitive expression 
“ready”, can be disquotationally reported in (24) regardless of the different contexts within 
which the original utterances were made. In the example, Rob might have been ready for an 
exam in one context and ready for the approaching rain in another:
(23) A: “Rob is ready.” (True)
(24) B: “A said that Rob was ready.” (True)
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, pp. 90-91)
Conversely, as Cappelen and Lepore illustrate, an utterance like (25), which contains two 
context sensitive-expressions (“I” and “yesterday”), cannot be disquotationally (truthfully) 
reported by a different speaker of English, as in (26), or on a different day8:
7 Travis (2008) argues that the inter-contextual disquotational test does not necessarily work 
for the alleged context-insensitive term “grunt”. In connection with the example in footnote 
6, Travis observes that a speaker could still claim that the boy in question grunts and go on 
to clarify that it is not the case that he has a habit of grunting. A similar argument could be 
made about the context sensitivity of “ready”. If Rob is ready for the heavy rain, it is clear 
that the speaker in (19) has not actually communicated the message that Rob is ready, for 
example, for an exam. This latter proposition, in a particular context, could still be taken to 
be false.
8 There are languages that shift the reference of the first-person pronoun in indirect reports. 
In Amharic, for example, Rob’s utterance of “I’m a teacher” can be reported as “Robi says 
that Ii am a teacher (adapted from Schlenker, 2003, p. 31).
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(25) A: “I wasn’t ready yesterday.” (True)
(26) B: * “A said that I wasn’t ready yesterday.” (False)
 (adapted from Cappelen & Lepore, 2005, p. 89)
When the IDIRT is applied to slurs, it appears that such lexical items would, once again, 
not constitute context-sensitive expressions. As (27) and (28) illustrate, such a conclusion 
could be reached, at first sight, in both negative and positive contexts. In each of the 
examples below, B’s reporting statements will continue to be true:
(27) A (a bigot): “Rob is an ε.” (True)
 B (a bigot): “A said that Rob is an ε.” (True)
(28) A (a proud in-group speaker): “Rob is an ε.” (True)
 B (a proud in-group speaker): “A said that Rob is an ε.” (True)
It has to be noted, however, that the application of the IDIRT to racial and ethnic slurs 
presents a similar concern to those that I discussed in relation to the two previous tests. 
While it is clear that A, the proud in-group speaker in (28), has communicated the message 
that she considers Rob to be one of her friends, a report by an individual whom the hearer 
knows is a bigot would intuitively render the reported statement to be false. In such a 
situation, it could be claimed that it cannot be the case (in other terms, that it is false) that A, 
the original speaker, has derogatorily and/or offensively said that Rob is an “ε”.9
While I have demonstrated that Cappelen and Lepore’s tests suggest that slurs are 
to be taken as context-sensitive expressions, and while slurs can convey negative or 
positive messages in different contexts, it is important to point out that derogation and/or 
offensiveness can still be taken to reside within emotionally loaded slurring lexical items 
themselves. This is because, although slurs can communicate positive messages in particular 
contexts, bigots, in-group members, and bystanding hearers alike can all be taken to identify 
slurring negative expressiveness whenever racial and ethnic slurs are employed. In other 
words, hearers of strong racial and ethnic slurs can be taken to recognise derogatory and/or 
offensive expressiveness whenever slurring language is uttered. 
Conclusion
My aim in this paper was to argue that racial and ethnic slurs pass Cappelen and Lepore’s 
(2005) collectivity, inter-contextual disquotational, and intercontextual disquotational 
indirect reporting tests. I have shown that, intuitively, this is the case, and I have 
consequently concluded that slurs are also sensitive to context in a truth-related sense. In the 
future, Cappelen and Lepore’s context sensitivity tests could still be applied to (and work 
well in relation to) different types of lexical items; what is clear, at this stage, is that racial 
and ethnic slurring words pass them. 
9 Travis (2008) claims that the alleged context-insensitive term “grunt” also passes the 
IDIRT. In the context described in footnote 6, it is false that one of the friends said that the 
boy “grunts” if she does not share the meaning that the other friend attributed to that word.
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